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Abstract:  East Asia’s small open economies were hit in varying degrees by the sharp 
drop in the output of major industrial countries during the global financial and 
economic crisis of 2008-2009. This highlights the role of monetary policy regimes in 
cushioning small open economies from adverse external output shocks. To assess the 
welfare impact of external shocks on key macroeconomic variables under different 
monetary policy regimes, we numerically solve and calculate the welfare loss function 
of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We find that CPI inflation 
targeting minimizes welfare losses for import-to-GDP ratios from 0.3 to 0.9. However, 
welfare under the pegged exchange rate regime is almost equivalent to CPI inflation 
targeting when the import-to-GDP ratio is one while the Taylor-type rule minimizes 
welfare when the import-to-GDP ratio is 0.1. We calibrate the model and derive welfare 
implications for eight East Asian small open economies. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 was triggered by the 
bursting of the US housing market bubble.  The sharp decline in housing prices 
drastically reduced the values of mortgaged–backed financial instruments and inflicted 
heavy losses on US financial institutions, which curtailed their credit to the real 
economy.  As a result of the ensuing credit crunch, US real GDP began its steep decline 
in the first quarter of 2008.  From this benchmark date, the cumulative contraction in 
US real GDP growth relative to trend is estimated to be –6.7%.  The financial 
institutions of other industrial countries had bought large amounts of US mortgaged–
backed financial instruments.  As a result, the financial crisis spread to other industrial 
countries.  Real GDP of the other G7 countries began declining around the first quarter 
of 2008, and from this benchmark date, suffered an average cumulative contraction in 
real GDP growth of 7.8% relative to trend.
1   
Despite the limited exposure of their financial institutions to US mortgaged–backed 
financial instruments, East Asian economies experienced large declines in real GDP. 
Table 1 shows the cumulative contraction in real GDP growth, relative to trend, of 
11.8% to 13.08% for Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and 7.3% to 8.26 % for 
Malaysia, Philippines, Korea and Thailand.  The least affected country is Indonesia with 
a cumulative loss of 1.11%.  Table 1 suggests that the primary channel for the 
transmission of the global crisis to East Asia was the trade channel.  The cumulative 
contraction of real export growth ranged from 10.51% for Singapore to 38.78% for 
Thailand.  Indonesia experienced the least cumulative loss of 5.96%.  It is not surprising 
that exports have a large impact on the real GDP of East Asian countries in light of their 
heavy export dependence.  The ratio of export to GDP ranges from 31.56% to 42.88% 
for Indonesia, Philippines and Korea, around 50% for Taiwan and Thailand, and over 
100% for Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong.  In short, East Asian emerging markets 
with relatively sound financial systems were affected by the crisis primarily through the 
G7 output shock. 
                                                        
1  We consider 2008 Q1 as the benchmark date of the 2008 financial crisis.  We follow Blanchard 
and Gali (2007) in calculating the cumulative change in real GDP gain or loss over eight quarters 
following benchmark date relative to the trend given by the cumulative real GDP growth rate over 
the preceding eight quarters.  
2 
 
Table 1.  Selected Economic Indicators of Small Open Economies in East Asia 
Country 
Cumulative % 
change in Real 
GDP Growth 
Average % 




exchange rate  
Cumulative % 









Monetary Policy ( 2008) 
Newly Industrializing Countries 
Hong Kong  –13.08  0.38  –0.42  –18.40  158.60  172  Fixed Exchange Rate under the currency board 
Singapore   –11.8  2.03  3.98  –10.51  215.05  191  Pegged to a basket of currencies 
Korea –7.65  1.32  27.16  –15.62  36.20 39  Inflation  Targeting 
Taiwan –12.04  0.14  –3.01  –23.00  53.46  40 
Aims for stable prices and intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market  
ASEAN – 4 
Malaysia –7.32  0.21  6.92  –20.34  102.24  90  Aims for stable prices and stable effective exchange rate  
Indonesia –1.11  –2.55  9.17  –5.96 31.54  27  Inflation  Targeting 
Philippines –7.49  1.77  12.28  –19.99 42.88  48  Inflation  Targeting 
Thailand –8.26  –1.11  7.61  –38.78 57.61  64  Inflation  Targeting 
Benchmark: USA  –6.72  –1.29           11  Taylor rule  
Notes:  We consider 2008 Q1 as the benchmark date of the 2008 financial crisis.  We follow Blanchard and Gali (2007) in calculating the cumulative change in 
real GDP gain or loss over eight quarters following benchmark date relative to the trend given by the cumulative real GDP growth rate over the 
preceding eight quarters.  The change in CPI inflation (national currency to US dollar) is the average rate of inflation (depreciation or appreciation) in 
eight quarters following each of the benchmark date minus the average inflation (depreciation or appreciation) rate over the eight quarters immediately 
following the benchmark date.  A positive (negative) sign in the fourth column indicates the depreciation (appreciation) of the national currency against 
the US dollar.  All quarterly data are from CEIC Data on Emerging Markets except for export and import as a percentage of GDP which are from the 
World Development Indicator online (August 2011).  When available, seasonally adjusted Real GDP are used.  Information on countries that target 
inflation are from Truman (2003) except for Indonesia which is from the Bank of Indonesia website.  Information on the monetary policy of Singapore 
is from the Monetary Authority of Singapore website.  Information on the monetary policies of Malaysia and Taiwan are from the Economic Intelligent 
Unit's 2008 Country Reports. Murray et al. (2009) argue that the US Fed followed the Taylor principle from 1985 to 2009.  Exchange rate is defined as 
national currency per US dollar.    
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Table 1 also shows the various monetary and exchange rate policies adopted by 
East Asian countries.  Hong Kong and Singapore have fixed and pegged exchange rate 
regimes respectively while Korea, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand have adopted 
inflation targeting policies.  In contrast, Taiwan and Malaysia aim to stabilize prices and 
intervene in the foreign exchange rate markets.  These policies seem to be consistent 
with the average change in the exchange rates relative to trend.  Countries which target 
exchange rate – Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore – showed lower average changes in 
exchange rates than countries which target inflation – Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and 
Thailand.
2  The exception is Malaysia, which target both variables but experienced an 
average change in exchange rate closer to inflation targeting countries.
3  In addition, 
countries which target the exchange rate suffered a visibly larger cumulative decline in 
real GDP compared to countries which target inflation.  Inflation has been generally low 
for all countries.
4 
The global crisis of 2008-2009 highlights the vulnerability of small open economies 
to adverse external shocks.  The crisis, or more precisely the severe recession in 
industrialized countries due to the crisis, had a pronounced output effect even on 
fundamentally sound small open economies with strong fundamentals, such as those of 
East Asia.  This raises some important questions which we try to address in this paper.  
Why were some countries more affected than others in the face of a negative foreign 
output shock?  What role did monetary and exchange rate policy regimes play in 
mitigating the negative foreign output shock?  Could East Asian countries have done 
better in the presence negative foreign output shocks with alternative policy regimes?  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explores the relationship 
between monetary and exchange rate policy regimes and macroeconomic performance.  
Section 3 specifies our model, Section 4 reports and discusses the main results, and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                        
2  Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore experienced the smallest average percentage change in 
exchange rates of –0.42%, –3.01% and 3.98%, respectively.  In contrast, Korea, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand experienced an average percentage change in exchange rates in the range 
of 6.92% to 27.16%. 
3  Malaysia experienced an average change in exchange rates of 6.90%. 
4  In fact, Indonesia and Thailand experienced deflation.  
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2.  Role of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Cushioning 
External Shocks 
 
The current crisis calls for a re–examination of the macroeconomic policies in 
general and monetary and exchange rate policies in particular.  Stiglitz (2008) argues 
that inflation targeting is inappropriate, especially for emerging economies where 
energy and commodities make up a larger share of the household budget than in 
industrialized countries.  Other economists have also suggested alternative monetary 
policy targets such as nominal GDP.
5  In addition, Blanchard et al. (2010) argue that 
there may be a case for the emerging-market central bankers’ practice of targeting 
inflation while also intervening in the foreign exchange markets.  Despite the criticism 
of inflation targeting, de Carvalho Filho (2010) finds that inflation targeting countries 
outperformed non–inflation targeting countries in the post-2008 period.  He argues that 
during the crisis, inflation targeting countries lowered nominal interest rates by more, 
resulting in even larger real interest rate differentials and a powerful monetary stimulus. 
The theoretical and empirical literature also suggest that countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes can better insulate their economies from negative real shocks.
6 
More relevant to East Asian countries and the transmission of foreign output shocks 
during the 2008-2009 crisis, Hoffmann (2007) shows that countries which allow the 
nominal exchange rate to fluctuate achieve a steadier adjustment of real GDP.  The 
smaller decline of real GDP under flexible exchange rate regimes is explained by real 
exchange rate depreciation, which partly offsets the negative impact of foreign output 
shocks by improving export competitiveness.   
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relative effectiveness of 
                                                        
5  A debate on nominal GDP targeting among economists could be accessed online at 
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/12/bernanke-and-mishkin-on-nominal-
gdp-growth-targeting.html 
6  Friedman (1953) and subsequently Mundell (1961) argue that in the presence of price stickiness, 
flexible exchange rates act as a shock absorber in a small open economy.  When an economy is hit 
by real shocks, the economy with flexible exchange rates allows relative prices to adjust more 
quickly than an economy with fixed exchange rates so output adjustment will be smaller and 
smoother.  While the theoretical literature including Poole (1970), Dornbusch (1980), Läufer (1994), 
and more recently Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Devereux (2004), and Devereux, et al.(2006) show 
conditions under which the Friedman-Mundell proposition does not hold, empirical literature such as 




alternative monetary policy regimes in mitigating negative external output shocks in a 
small open economy.  We develop a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model with a goods market characterized by imperfect competition and 
nominal rigidities.
7  We describe the response of a small open economy to negative 
foreign output shocks under various types of monetary policy regimes - a fixed or 
pegged exchange rate rule, a CPI inflation targeting rule, inflation and exchange rate 
targeting rule, domestic inflation targeting, Taylor–type rule,  nominal output targeting, 
and real output targeting.  The open economy framework allows us to consider the 
exchange rate channel in the transmission of foreign output shocks to the economy.  
Foreign output shocks are assumed to be exogenous to country-level variables.  
In contrast to many DSGE models which consider only two factor inputs, we follow 
Kim and Loungani (1992) in considering oil as an input in a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function where oil and capital are substitutes.  Hence, we 
incorporate in the model the fact that more developed economies have lower ratios of 
energy use per capital compared with less developed economies.  In addition, exchange 
rate depreciation could affect imported prices of oil which in turn, affects domestic 
output.  
As in Monacelli (2004), capital is subject to adjustment costs.  The model has a 
monetary policy regime that assigns different weights on the output gap, inflation and 
deviations of nominal exchange rate from theoretical parity.  By explicitly analyzing the 
response of the economy to foreign output shocks under different types of monetary 
policy regimes, we address the extent to which output volatility can be attributed to 
foreign output shocks.  In addition, we help to identify the dynamics of various 
macroeconomic aggregates including output, inflation, terms-of-trade, nominal and real 
exchange rates and nominal interest rate. 
  
                                                        
7  In recent years, there has been an outpouring research on open economy DSGE models that 
incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities.  Since the publication of the Redux model 
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995 and 1996), the research on open-economy macroeconomics has 
produced a synthesis of dynamic intertemporal approaches with sticky-price models of 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  This synthesis has subsequently become widely known as the new 
open economy macroeconomics, NOEM.  This new class of models has allowed economists to 




3.  The Model 
 
In this section, we lay out our model, which is broadly based on Monacelli’s (2004) 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a small open economy.  We 
incorporate oil in the model as an input to a CES production function following Kim 
and Loungani (1992).
8  The other inputs of domestic production are labor and capital.  
Identical and infinitely lived households consume baskets of differentiated domestic and 
foreign tradable goods.  Households derive income from working and renting physical 
capital to the domestic firms. 
 
3.1.  Households 
Households consume baskets of differentiated domestic and foreign goods which 
are both tradable and indexed by j .    
11 1 1
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   are defined as the utility–based price indices associated to the 
baskets of domestic and foreign varieties of goods, respectively.  The subscript H is the 
index for home and F for foreign.  The price indices are expressed in units of domestic 
currency.    , Ht Pj  and   , Ft Pj  are prices of the individual domestic and foreign good j , 
respectively, where  1   is the elasticity of substitution between varieties within each 
category.  In each period, the households optimally allocate their expenditure on 
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    
 
     (1) 
for all j goods within the interval of 0 and 1 where the goods are produced by a 
continuum of firms and the firms are owned by domestic households. 
                                                        
8  Backus and Crucini (2000) also follow Kim and Loungani in nesting capital and oil as a CES 
function within a Cobb-Douglas production function.  Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) consider oil as an input to production together with labor.  In contrast, 
Finn (2000) introduces a capital utilization rate and assumes oil and capital as complimentary. 
Whether capital and oil are substitutes or complements is unresolved in empirical literature. 










  and    
1 1 1





   are composite indices of 
domestic and foreign goods, respectively.  The households consume a CES composite of 
both home products ( , H C ) and foreign products ( F C ): 
 
1 1 11 1
,, 1 tH t F t CC C
     

        ( 2 )  
where    0,1    is the share of home–produced goods in total consumption so  1  
represents the share of foreign–produced goods.   1    is the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign goods.  For simplicity, we assume that the investment 
composite index   ,, , tH t F t In In In
 
has an identical expression.  The utility–based 
consumer price index is given by:  
 
1/1 11
,, 1 tH t F t PP P
  
          ( 3 )  
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure between domestic and foreign 
goods yields the consumption demand: 
,,
,, ;( 1 )
Ht Ft









   
 
    ( 4 )  
The domestic economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely–lived identical 
households indexed byi .  From here on, we will drop the indexation for simplicity. 














              ( 5 )  
where 0    and  0   .   is the discount factor and    0,1   . 1/ is the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, and   is the elasticity of labor substitution.   t E is the 
expectation operator.   t C is the consumption and  t N  is the labor supply of the 
representative household at time t.  In each period, the representative household holds 
bonds denominated in domestic currency, rents out his capital to the home–based 
monopolistic competitive firm and derives income from working.  Therefore, the 
household’s budget constraint can be written as:  
     1 1 tt t tt t t t t tt t PC I n E B W N Z K i B              (6)  
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where  t B  is the quantity of nominal bonds acquired at time t which expire at  1 t  ,  t i is 
the nominal interest rate,  t W is the nominal wage,  t Z is the nominal rental cost and  t   
represents the lump–sum transfer payment.  










   

         ( 7 )  
where is the physical depreciation rate of capital.  The function  .  , which is 
increasing and concave, assumes the adjustment cost in capital accumulation.  That is, 
t In  units of investment translate into    ttt InKK  units of additional capital.  
The first order conditions are derived from maximizing the utility function subject 
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 (11) 
Eq. (8) states the relationship between the utility from consumption and disutility 
from labor. Eq. (9) is the Euler equation governing the dynamic evolution of 
consumption. Eq. (10) specifies the intertemporal conditions for efficiency in 
investment.  It determines the investment rate as a function of t Q , which is the market 
value of one unit of new capital. Eq. (11) is the evolution of  t Q over time.  We assume 
that there is neither average nor marginal costs of adjustment in the steady state.  Hence, 












    

.  The 
specifications for the rest of the world assume foreign households have similar 
preferences as in the home country.  The foreign demand for home produced good j is  
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3.2.  Domestic Firms 
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by   0,1 j . 
Following Kim and Loungani (1992), we employ a nested CES production function 
with constant return to scale.  Firms use labor, capital and oil according to the following 
specification:  
    
  
(1 )/ 1 11 1 tt t t t Yj AK j O j N j
  
            (12)  
where01   ,  0    and  0   .  The elasticity of substitution between capital and oil is 
equal to 1/  while labor share in production is given by .  
In the production unit, the constant return to scale production technology implies 
that the unit cost equals to the nominal marginal cost (MC).  Hence, the efficiency 







































        ( 1 5 )  
respectively.   t mc is the real marginal cost,  , Ot P
 is the oil price denominated in foreign 
currency and  t  is the nominal exchange rate.  
Following Calvo (1983), firms set prices on a staggered basis.  In each period, firms 
that adjust their prices are randomly selected with a fraction 1 p   of all firms adjusting 
while the remaining fraction  p   not adjusting their prices.  The parameter  p  represents 
the degree of nominal rigidity.  A larger  p  implies fewer firms adjust their prices and 
the expected time between price changes will be longer.  As a pricing unit, domestic 
firm j faces domestic and foreign demand.  Profits at some future date t+k are affected 
by the choice of price at time t only if the firm does not get another opportunity to adjust  
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its price between t and t+k.  The probability of a firm not adjusting its price from t to 
t+k is
k
p  .  Hence, the domestic firm j will set price ,
New
H t P to maximize the profit function:  
      ,,
0
kk n e w
tp t t k H t t k t k
k
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     (17) 
The above equation describes the dynamic markup for price setting.  When the price 
signal  p   equals to zero, Eq. (17) becomes     , 1
new
H tt Pj M C   .  With symmetric 
equilibrium, the domestic aggregate price index is:
  
 
 11 1 1
,, 1 , 1
new
Ht p Ht p Ht PP P
   
  
           
  (18) 
 
3.3.  Price Level, Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate 
The nominal exchange rate  t  is the price of one unit of foreign currency in terms of 
domestic currency.  With the law of one price,  ,, H tt H t PP 
  and ,, Ft t Ft PP 
  .  The terms 






















For a small open economy, domestic price changes do not affect the foreign price 
level so without loss of generality, we assume that , Ft t PP
    where the foreign price 
level is determined by the prices of non–oil goods and oil.  Hence, it can be expressed 




t N Ot Ot PP P
      .  For simplicity, we normalize , NO t P
 to one so the foreign non–
oil inflation, , NO t 
 , is zero.  The total CPI inflation is defined as    1 log tt t PP     and  
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the domestic inflation is defined as    ,, , 1 log Ht Ht Ht PP    .  The no arbitrage condition 
can be written as  1 1/ 1 / tt t t ii  

   .  
 
3.4.  Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Regimes 
Following Monacelli (2004), the monetary policy regime acts such that deviations 
of inflation, output and nominal exchange rate from their long–run target have feedback 





















       ( 1 9 )  
where  t i is the inflation target and  , y    and    are weights assigned to the 
movements of CPI inflation, output and nominal exchange rate, respectively.  Eq. (19) 
could also be modified to consider domestic inflation rather than CPI inflation and the 






where    H  is the weight on domestic 
inflation.  The actual short–run interest rate is determined based on the monetary 
authority’s desire to smooth changes in the nominal interest rate: 
   
1
1 11 1 tt t iii
  
           ( 2 0 )  
The exogenous stochastic processes for the foreign output, foreign interest rate, 
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3.5.  Welfare 
We analyze the impact of various monetary policy regimes based on social welfare 
loss function minimized by the central banks.  The function is based on the second-order 
Taylor expansion of the household’s utility around the steady state as in Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1998, 1999) and Woodford (2003) and extended to small open economies by 
                                                        
9  See also Taylor (1993), Clarida et al. (1999) and Monacelli (2004).  




Chung et al. (2007) and Divino (2009).  The social welfare loss function is derived as in 









WE y y  


         (21) 
Where 












   , 














t y  is obtained by setting the probability of non-adjustment in price,  p  ,  close 
to zero.  
 
3.6.  Model Parameterization  
The model is solved numerically.
11  We follow Monacelli’s (2004) parameterization 
of a small open economy where the marginal disutility of work effort   is set to 3.  As 
commonly accepted in the Calvo (1983) pricing model, the probability of price non–
adjustment, , is set at 0.75.  The steady–state markup,    /1   , equals to 1.2.  The 
inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  , is set at 0.50 and the labor share of 
output equals 0.70.  The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign produced 
goods, ρ, is 1.01.  The elasticity of investment rate to the price of capital  equals to 3.  
As for the monetary policy regime parameters, the interest rate smoothing 
parameter, χ, is set at 0.5.  We set  0.99     for fixed or pegged exchange rate and
0.1     for flexible exchange rate.  Under the flexible exchange rate regime, the central 
bank could choose to target only CPI inflation and set    = 1.5 and  y   = 0 or only 
domestic inflation and set    H  = 1.5 and  y   = 0; or choose to follow the Taylor rule so 
  = 1.5 and y   = 0.5; or target nominal output and set    = 1.5 and y   = 1.5 or real 
output and set     = 0 and y   = 1.5.  The central bank could also target CPI inflation and 
exchange rate and set    = 1.5,  0   y  and  0.8    .  
The serial correlation of the oil price shocks (ρ
y*) equals to 0.90, which is from the 
                                                        
11  The numerical solution of the model is described in Uhlig (1997).  
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time series evidence on price of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude.  The serial 
correlation parameters of foreign interest rate (ρ
i*), foreign output (ρ
y*) and technology 
(ρ
a) are also set to 0.90.  The degree of the impact of oil price on the foreign price level 
(γ
NO) equals 0.01 for a positive oil price shock and 0.001 for a negative oil price shock. 
These settings reflect the asymmetric effect of oil price shocks.
12  W e also consider 
these asymmetric effects in assuming that a positive oil price shock has significant 
effect on marginal cost while a negative oil price shock has negligible effect on 
marginal cost.  The share of capital relative to oil in production (ι) is 0.90.  The standard 
deviations from the steady state of oil price ( o P
 
 ) of foreign nominal interest rate (
* i
  ) 
and of technology (
a
  ) are set at 1%.  The standard deviation of foreign output from the 
steady state is set to –1% over one period.  
We calculate the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between oil and capital, , 
to get an expression of the steady state of the oil to capital ratio as a function of the 
parameters  υ,  δ,  β and ι.
13  We follow Kim and Loungani (1992) in setting the 
depreciation rate,  ,   equals to 0.1225 and the discount rate, , equals to 0.96.  The 
share of oil relative to capital stock, (1– ), is 0.10.  Given these parameter values,   is 
calculated based on average energy–to–capital ratio of 0.65 for Indonesia, 0.59 for 
Philippines, 0.46 for Malaysia, 0.45 for Thailand, 0.27 for Korea, 0.22 for Singapore, 
0.06 for Hong Kong and 0.05 for Taiwan and 0.11 for the USA which is our benchmark 
country.  These values are used to calculate   of 9.3 for Indonesia, 7.8 for Philippines, 
5.2 for Malaysia, 5 for Thailand, 3.1 for Korea, 2.7 for Singapore, 1.45 for Hong Kong, 
1.4 for Taiwan and 1.8 for the US.
14  The estimates for the US are comparable to Kim 
and Loungani’s setting of   equals to 1.7 and an elasticity of substitution of 0.59 for 
                                                        
12  For example, Chen et al. (2005) find empirical evidence that gasoline prices in the US responds 
quickly to a crude oil price increase but not to a decrease.   















   , which is  
the steady-state rental cost of capital.  The details of the derivation are in the Appendix. 
14  Data on energy use in kiloton of oil equivalent (KOE) and gross capital formation are from the 
World Economic Indicator (WDI) for Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines and the United States and CEIC Database for Taiwan.  We calculate energy 
use by multiplying energy use in KOE by the average price of a kiloton of crude oil in 2000 US 
dollars.  We use the consumer price index (CPI) to convert energy use in 2000 US dollars to 1985 
international dollars vis-à-vis the United States.  Data on CPI and the price of crude oil are from the 




   As a proxy for the parameter on the proportion of foreign goods in total 




4.  Simulation Results and Welfare 
 
In this section, we report and discuss our simulation results, including estimates of 
welfare losses under alternative monetary policy regimes. 
 
4.1.  Impulse Responses under Various Monetary Policy Regimes 
The simulated impulse responses in Figures 1 to 7 represent the dynamic responses 
of real output, inflation, terms–of–trade, nominal and real exchange rates under seven 
monetary policy regimes: fixed or pegged exchange rate regime, the strict (CPI) 
inflation targeting, exchange rate and CPI inflation targeting, the Taylor rule, strict 
(domestic) inflation targeting, nominal GDP targeting and real GDP targeting.   
 
Figure 1.  Impulse Responses to a Shock in Foreign Output under Fixed/Pegged 
Exchange Rate 














































Figure 3.  Impulse Responses to a Shock in Foreign Output under Exchange rate 







































Years after shock 








































Figure 4.  Impulse Responses to a Shock in Foreign Output under Taylor Rule 




Figure 5.  Impulse Responses to a Shock in Foreign Output with domestic inflation 
Targeting 
 





































Years after shock 





























































































































A negative foreign output shock  has the biggest impact on domestic output under 
fixed or pegged exchange rate regime followed by CPI inflation and exchange rate 
targeting, CPI inflation targeting, domestic inflation targeting, Taylor–type rule, nominal 
GDP targeting and the least under real GDP targeting.  For a 1% decline in foreign 
output, real output declines from its steady state by 0.42% under fixed exchange rate 
regime, 0.41% under CPI inflation-cum-exchange rate targeting, 0.36% under CPI 
inflation targeting, 0.23% under domestic inflation targeting, 0.25% under Taylor rule 
and 0.19% under nominal output.  Under real output targeting, it rises by 0.03% in the 
first period before declining by 0.08%.  
The mitigated effect on real output under real and nominal output targeting and to a 
lesser extent, Taylor-type rule, could be explained by the large and sharp depreciation in 
the nominal exchange rate following a negative foreign output shock.  In the period 
following the 1% negative foreign output shock, nominal exchange rate depreciates 
from the steady state value by 0.64% for real output targeting, 0.35% for nominal output 
targeting and 0.24% for Taylor-type rule.  In turn, the large exchange rate depreciation 
increases the prices of oil and other imports, causing higher total CPI inflation. 
Likewise, expectations of higher inflation and further depreciation raise the nominal 
interest rate.      
The impact on the nominal interest rate is shown in Figure 8 where a 1% negative 
foreign output shock increases nominal interest rate by 0.41%, 0.11% and 0.08% from 
the steady state for nominal output targeting, real output targeting and Taylor-type rule, 
respectively.  In contrast, nominal exchange rate depreciates only by 0.08%, 0.02% and 
0.017% for CPI inflation, domestic inflation and CPI inflation-cum-exchange rate 
targeting, respectively.  This leads to a reduction of CPI inflation from its steady state by 
0.02% for CPI inflation targeting, 0.03% for pegged exchange rate regime and CPI 
inflation and exchange rate targeting, and 0.06% for domestic inflation targeting two 
periods after the shock.  Hence, nominal interest rate in Figure 8 shows a decline from 
steady state values of 0.02%, 0.06% and 0.006% for CPI inflation, domestic inflation 
and CPI inflation-cum-exchange rate targeting, respectively.  The nominal interest rate 
hardly changes under pegged exchange rate regime.  The impulse responses clearly 
show a tradeoff between lower output volatility and higher inflation and nominal 
interest rate volatility.  
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Figure 8.  Impulse Responses of Interest Rate to a Negative Foreign Output Shock 




4.2.  Welfare Losses under Various Monetary Policies  
We examine the impact of various monetary policies after a negative foreign output 
shock using a welfare loss function described in section 2.7 and shown in Table 2 with 
the model parameters of oil to capital ratio of 0.25 and import to GDP ratio of 0.5 taken 
as average values for East Asian countries.  The results show the best to worst welfare 
outcomes as follows: CPI inflation targeting, CPI inflation-cum-exchange rate targeting, 
pegged exchange rate regime, domestic inflation targeting, Taylor-type rule, nominal 
output targeting and real output targeting.  CPI inflation targeting delivers the best 
welfare outcome under negative foreign output shock.  These results indicate that while 
CPI inflation targeting causes a decline of 0.36% from steady state real output, as 
opposed to 0.19%-0.25% under Taylor type–rule and nominal output targeting, both CPI 
inflation and nominal interest rate decline from their steady state values by around 
0.02%, leading to a sharp rebound in real output.  As mentioned above, this contrasts 
with a rise in nominal interest rate under Taylor-type rule and nominal and real output 
targeting. 
 







































Table 2.  Welfare Loss after a Negative Foreign Output Shock under Different 
Monetary Policies  
Monetary policy 
Weights in the interest rate rule  Welfare 
loss  ωπ  ωπH  ωy  ωε 
Fixed / peg exchange rate regime 0  0  0  0.99  –1.96 
CPI Inflation targeting  1.5  0  0  0.1  –0.57 
Exchange rate and inflation targeting  1.5  0  0  0.8  –1.58 
Taylor rule  1.5  0  0.5  0.1  –7.47 
Domestic inflation targeting  0  1.5  0  0.1  –2.91 
Nominal output targeting  1.5  0  1.5  0.1  –33.15 
Real output targeting  0  0  1.5  0.1  –85.48 
Notes:  The Welfare loss is calculated based on the average percent of import over real GDP of 50% 
for the six East Asian countries excluding Hong Kong and Singapore which have percent 
import over GDP of 172% and 191%, respectively.  The average oil-to-capital ratio is 0.25 
and the average elasticity of substitution of oil to capital is 3.14 excluding the Philippines 
and Indonesia which have an average oil-to-capital (elasticity of substitution of oil for 
capital) of 0.58 (7.8) and 0.90 (9.3) respectively.  In the model, the import to GDP is (1–γ) 
while the elasticity of substitution of oil and capital is υ. ωπ, ωπH, ωy, and ωε are the weights 
on overall inflation, domestic inflation, output gap and exchange rate in the interest rate rule 
equation.    
 
Since there are large variations in import-to-GDP ratio among East Asian countries, 
we conduct sensitivity analysis based on this ratio, represented by the parameter (1-γ). 
This is the proportion of import in household consumption in the model.  Table 3 shows 
the estimates of welfare losses due to a 1% negative output shock for various ratios of 
import-to-GDP given an oil-to-capital ratio of 0.25 under different monetary policy 
regimes.  The results show that for an economy with import-to-GDP ratio of one, CPI 
inflation targeting, pegged exchange rate regime and a combination of CPI inflation and 
exchange rate targeting minimize the welfare losses.
15 
In contrast, for an economy with import-to-GDP ratio of 0.1, Taylor-type rule 
delivers the best welfare outcome, followed by domestic inflation and then CPI inflation 
targeting.  For countries with import-to-GDP ratios of 0.3 to 0.9, CPI inflation targeting 
delivers the best welfare outcomes.  These results indicate that countries with a large 
                                                        
15  CPI inflation targeting has a slightly higher welfare (less negative) compared to pegged exchange 
rate regime.  
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import component could control inflation just as well by targeting exchange rates since 
imported inflation makes up a large proportion of overall or CPI inflation.  In contrast, 
countries with small import relative to GDP would be less affected by the depreciation 
of their currencies and the resulting imported inflation and would benefit from the lower 
output volatility associated with a Taylor-type interest rate rule. 
 
Table 3.  Welfare Loss after a Negative Foreign Output Shock under Different 

























1  –0.170 –0.170 –0.170  –51.859  –42.253  –229.546  –644.085 
0.9  –0.342 –0.180 –0.291  –38.550 –28.165 –168.759 –473.360 
0.7  –1.286 –0.386 –1.014  –18.835 –10.385  –81.339 –221.218 
0.5  –1.958 –0.571 –1.583  –7.468 –2.907 –33.151 –85.484 
0.3  –1.785 –0.572 –1.510  –2.146 –0.772 –10.832 –26.843 
0.1  –0.968 –0.389 –0.869  –0.327  –0.333 –2.416 –6.020 
Note:  We use import over GDP as a proxy for (1–γ) in the model.  The elasticity of oil- to-capital is 
set at 3.14 as in Table 2. 
 
We also calibrate the model for a pair of countries based on their ratios of oil to 
capital and of import to GDP and calculate the welfare losses under various monetary 
policy regimes.  The pairs of countries are Hong Kong and Singapore, Korea and 
Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand, and Indonesia and the Philippines.  The estimates of 
welfare losses under various monetary policy regimes are shown in Table 4.  They show 
that either fixed/pegged exchange rate regimes or CPI inflation targeting deliver the best 
welfare outcomes for Hong Kong and Singapore.  On the other hand, CPI inflation 
targeting delivers the best welfare outcomes for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 





Table 4.  Welfare Loss after a Negative Oil Price Shock under Different Monetary 
Policies Calibrated for Various East Asian Countries 
Countries 
Monetary policy 



















Hong Kong and 
Singapore  –0.175 –0.175 –0.176  –53.441  –46.200 –243.183  –674.385 
Korea and Taiwan  –1.952  –0.601  –1.618 –4.054 –1.462  –10.832  –50.834 
Malaysia and 
Thailand  –0.726 –0.257 –0.579  –27.257  –16.377 –10.832  –313.530 
Philippines and 
Indonesia  –1.849 –0.543 –1.516 –4.372 –1.354  –10.832  –43.436 
Notes:  Hong Kong and Singapore have an average import over GDP of 1, and elasticity of 
substitution of 2.1.  Korea and Taiwan have an average import over GDP of 0.4 and an 
elasticity of substitution of oil and capital of 2.3.  Malaysia and Thailand have an average 
import over GDP of 0.8 and an elasticity of substitution of oil and capital of 5.1.  Philippines 
and Indonesia have an average import over GDP of 0.4 and an elasticity of substitution of 
oil and capital of 8.5. 
 
4.3.  Summary of Simulation Results and Welfare 
Consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Hoffman (2007), the 
comparison between responses of alternative monetary policy regimes suggests that (1) 
both fixed exchange rate regime and inflation targeting tend to stabilize real exchange 
rate and inflation at the expense of substantial instability in the real economy, (2) the 
mitigated decline in real output under the Taylor–type rule is explained by the large 
depreciation of nominal and real exchange rates, and (3) inflation rate is lowest under 
CPI inflation targeting.  In addition, the decline in output is smallest under nominal and 
real GDP targeting due to the higher rate of nominal and real exchange rate 
depreciation.  However, both output targeting also led to the worst inflation outcome. 
Consistent with Friedman’s predictions, long run differences across regimes are not 
significant.     
We also compare the welfare effects of the various monetary policy regimes using a 
quadratic social welfare function.  We show that with an average oil-to-capital ratio of  
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0.27 and import-to-GDP ratio of 0.5, CPI inflation targeting leads to the best welfare 
outcome, followed by inflation and exchange rate targeting, pegged or fixed exchange 
rate regime, domestic inflation targeting, Taylor rule and nominal and real output 
targeting.  The simulation results show that a negative output shock causes the inflation 
rate and subsequently the nominal interest rate to decline under CPI inflation targeting. 
In contrast, inflation rises under Taylor rule or nominal and real output targeting due to 
the large depreciation in the nominal and real exchange rates.  These empirical findings 
are consistent with de Carvalho Filho (2010). 
If the import-to-GDP ratio is one, the welfare of countries with CPI inflation-cum-
exchange rate targeting is comparable to countries with either pegged exchange rate or 
CPI inflation targeting.  However, if the ratio is between 0.5 and 0.9, CPI inflation-cum-
exchange rate targeting is only second best to CPI inflation targeting.  If the ratio is less 
than 0.5, it is worse than either Taylor rule or CPI inflation or domestic inflation 
targeting. 
Since East Asian countries vary a lot with respect to the ratio of import-to-GDP, 
ranging from 27% for Indonesia to more than 100% for Singapore and Hong Kong, we 
calculate the welfare of various monetary policy regimes for ratios between 10% and 
100%.  We find that with import-to-GDP ratio of one, welfare under the fixed or pegged 
regime is almost equivalent to welfare under CPI inflation targeting.  This is consistent 
with the Chow and McNelis (2010) finding that Singapore’s welfare will not 
significantly improve if it switches to more flexible exchange rate system and inflation 
targeting.  Economies that depend heavily on imports such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong can moderate imported inflation by pegging the exchange rate.  In contrast, for 
imports-to-GDP ratio of 0.10, the Taylor rule delivers the best welfare outcome. 
Exchange rate devaluation has a limited impact on imported inflation but still mitigates 
the fall in output.  When import-to-GDP ratio is between 0.2 and 0.9, CPI inflation 







5.  Conclusions 
 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 underlined the vulnerability 
of small open economies to adverse external output shocks.  Although East Asia’s 
financial systems were largely immune from the global financial instability, their real 
economies were severely affected by the deep recession of the advanced economies. 
This re-ignites the debate about the appropriate monetary policy regime for a small open 
economy subject to external shocks.  The primary objective of our paper is to evaluate 
and compare the welfare impact of external output shocks acting through the trade 
channel in eight East Asian countries with different monetary policy regimes.  To do so, 
we use a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with sticky 
prices and imperfect competition in the goods market.  The alternative monetary policy 
regimes considered are fixed or pegged exchange rate regime, CPI and domestic 
inflation targeting, CPI inflation-cum-exchange rate targeting, the Taylor rule, and 
nominal and real output targeting.  
Although our DSGE model is highly simplified, we can use its simulation results to 
scrutinize Hoffman’s empirical evidence and identify significant differences in 
responses to foreign output shocks across monetary policy regimes.  Compared to a 
Taylor–type rule and nominal and real output targeting, fixed or pegged exchange rate 
regimes and inflation targeting prevents nominal exchange rate and inflation from 
adjusting and thus prevents the real exchange rate from depreciating.  The negative 
impact of a fall in foreign output is thus largely passed to the domestic economy.  The 
mitigated decline in real output under a Taylor–type rule and nominal and real targeting 
is explained by a larger depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rates.  We also 
verify that inflation rate is lowest under CPI inflation targeting and nominal exchange 
rate is stable under pegs.  Our simulation results are consistent with the de Carvalho 
Filho (2010) findings that inflation targeting countries have lower interest rates than 
non-inflation targeting countries. 
Our simulation results are also broadly consistent with the stylized facts of the East 
Asian experience during the 2008-2009 economic crisis.  As Table 1 shows, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which target the exchange rate, experienced the smallest  
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volatility in exchange rate but suffered the largest cumulative reduction in real GDP 
growth.  On the other hand, the other East Asian countries, which practice inflation 
targeting, experienced larger currency depreciation but suffered a smaller cumulative 
reduction in real GDP growth.  In addition, two of the inflation targeting countries, 
Indonesia and Thailand, experienced CPI deflation, as predicted by the model. 
Our welfare analysis shows that Hong Kong and Singapore’s pegged exchange rate 
regimes are optimal monetary policy regimes in light of their high ratios of imports to 
GDP.  This is consistent with the Chow and McNelis (2010) finding for Singapore.  We 
also find inflation targeting to be the optimal monetary regime for Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.  This is consistent with the study of Chung et al.  
(2007) for Korea.  However, we find that Taiwan and Malaysia could improve their 
monetary policies by moving from CPI inflation-cum-exchange rate targeting toward 
targeting only inflation.   
At a broader level, our analysis can provide some guidance about monetary policy 
regimes for small open economies.  For such economies, which depend heavily on 
exports and trade for growth, the capacity of monetary policy to cushion the impact of 
adverse external output shocks is one of the most import criteria for the appropriate 
policy regime.  The pronounced impact of the recession in the advanced economies on 
the small open economies during the global crisis of 2008-2009 underlines this point. 
Our DSGE model simulation results suggest that CPI inflation targeting delivers the 
best welfare outcome for most East Asian small open economies except for those with 
exceptionally high degree of import.  Therefore, an important additional benefit of CPI 
inflation targeting for small open economies may be that it protects them better from 
external output shocks.    
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1.  Steady State and Market Equilibrium 
Steady state variables, denoted with a bar, are assumed to be constant.  The steady 
state foreign price level and terms of trade are normalized to one.  In a symmetric 
equilibrium, all firms make identical decisions   ,, H tH t PjP  ,    ,, H tH t Yj Y  and
 tt Nj N    hold for all  j and  t.  Assuming the net supply of bonds is zero, the 
equilibrium in the domestic goods market requires  HH CCI n Y
   . From Eq. (11), 
together with the assumption on the steady state capital adjustment, the rental cost on 





          ( A 1 )  
Eqs. (15) and (16) imply that the capital–oil ratio is given by:  










       ( A 2 )  






         ( A 3 )  
From Eqs. (13), (14) and (15), the capital–output ratio is given by: 





       ( A 4 )  
where  
1






In the steady state, we assume export equals to import so that  HF CC O
  .  From 




   and 
investment is InK   , consumption at the steady state can be expressed as:  
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      
  
     ( A 5 )  
 
2.  The Log–linearization of the Model 
The model is solved by taking log–linear approximation around the steady state.  
We use a variable with a hat to denote the deviation from the steady state.  The model is 
described by a system of linear equations.  
 
Aggregate demand 
By log–linearizing Eq. (3) and using the definition of inflation, we obtain: 
     ,, , 1 ˆˆ ˆˆ 1 tH t F t F t pp             ( A 6 )  
Log–linearizing Eq. (9), we get:  
        11 1 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ tt t t t t t Ec c Ei E            ( A 7 )  
This equation shows that the household’s consumption adjusts according to the 
evolution of nominal interest rate and the expected inflation rate.  Higher expectation on 
future inflation rate will encourage household’s current consumption over future 
consumption.  
The uncovered interest parity implies  1 ˆˆ ˆˆ tt t t t ii E  

   . From Eqs. (1) and (2), 
together with the definition of the terms of trade, domestic demand on home and foreign 
goods are described as: 
   ,, ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1; H tt t F t t t cs c c s c           ( A 8 )  
The market equilibrium is given by:  
  
,, ˆˆ ˆ t tH H tH H t Y y Cc Cc I n i n
         ( A 9 )  
 
3.  Monetary Policy Regimes 
By taking a log–linear approximation of Eqs. (19) and (20), we get:
16 
    1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ 1 tt y t t t iy i                           (A10) 
where       1, 1, 1 1 yy                  ,    ˆ log 1 1 tt ii i    and 
                                                        
16  Here after, the lower case letters with ^ denote log-deviations from respective steady state values.  
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 =0.75.  This specification allows the approximation of the systematic behavior of 
monetary policy under various interest rate rules. 
 
4.  Aggregate Supply 
The production function suggests that: 
       ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 11 1 tt t t t ya n k o             (A11) 
From the log–linearization of Eqs. (17) and (18), the forward–looking Phillips curve 
for domestic inflation is: 
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